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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY:





With close to 1,000,000 legal and illegal immigrants entering the United States
every year and additional would-be immigrants from Cuba, Haiti, El Salvador,
and elsewhere clamoring for admission, immigration policy has emerged as an
important issue for the 1980's. How many should be admitted? Should preference
be given to persons with skills needed in the current economy or to refugees?-and
who is a "refugee"? Will today's Third World immigrants have a harder time
adjusting to America than their earlier, European counterparts? Are immigrants
taking jobs from American citizens? These and other questions are being raised by
the media daily.
Immigration policy involves value judgments about the motivation and poten-
tial contributions of particular individuals and groups, the probable ease of their
adjustment to America and of America's adjustment to them, and the political,
social, and economic consequences of admitting them--or the moral consequences
of not admitting them. The issues are complex, but they are not new., Debates
about immigration policy began with the establishment of the Thirteen Colonies
and have continued, at varying levels of intensity, to the present. Knowledge of
the history of these debates will not provide instant answers to the dilemmas of the
1980's, but such knowledge can inform our own debates and, at least, warn us of
possible pitfalls.
This article first will review scholarship outlining the major arguments raised
repeatedly by both sides in immigration policy debates throughout our history. It
will then analyze the use of these arguments and their resolution in immigration
policy in three specific historical situations: the early 18th century, the decades
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before the Civil War, and the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Finally, it will
suggest some of the implications of this history for immigration policy today.
Despite the familiar image of the Statue of Liberty holding out a torch of wel-
come to the poor and oppressed, the history of American immigration policy has
been marked by ambivalence toward the admission of newcomers. Throughout
that history, immigration advocates and opponents alike have based their positions
on both real and imagined characteristics of particular immigrant groups-and on
both real and imagined characteristics of the United States at the times when the
immigrants have sought admission. Immigration policy, therefore, has reflected
the hopes, fears, and needs of the policymakers as much as those of the would-be or
actual immigrants.
II
THE BASIC ARGUMENTS: PRO AND CON
Although immigrants have come from widely varying backgrounds and have
entered the country at every stage of its territorial and economic growth, the argu-
ments used to support or oppose their admission have remained remarkably consis-
tent from the colonial period to the present day. For instance, proponents of a
liberal immigration policy have argued that special categories of people-refu-
gees-should be admitted because they have been victims of political or religious
oppression or, less frequently, of natural disaster. Refugees have been perceived as
innocent victims of unfortunate circumstances, or as heroic figures demonstrating
their appreciation for the American system by choosing it over those of their home-
lands. Immigrants admitted under these rationales have included Protestant refu-
gees from the wars of the French King Louis XIV, white plantation owners fleeing
slave revolts in Haiti, liberal "48'ers" escaping repressive regimes after the failure
of the European revolutions of 1848, and, more recently, refugees from Commu-
nist-controlled countries in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.
Although humanitarianism cannot be discounted as a policymaking motive,
not all support for refugees has been disinterested. Immigration has often been
championed by groups who found it consistent with a pre-existing political or ide-
ological agenda. Southern slaveholders hurried to assist their displaced counter-
parts from Haiti because they themselves lived in constant fear of rebellion among
their own slaves. Mid-19th century liberals who welcomed the "48'ers" sought
and often received the newcomers' help in reform movements such as abolitionism
and women's rights. Government assistance to the early refugees from Fidel
Castro's Cuba was motivated at least in part by their political usefulness in the
Cold War and their potential military usefulness against the Castro regime.
Most immigrants, however, have not been refugees. They have been farmers,
workers, tradespeople, or, especially in recent years, professionals, immigrating in
search of economic opportunity. Advocates of a liberal immigration policy have
argued that, since America has always been a nation of immigrants, newcomers
should be given the opportunities extended to earlier generations. Minorities have
often championed newcomers of similar ethnic or religious backgrounds. From the
17th century to the 20th, defenders of a liberal immigration policy have stressed
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the link between immigration and economic development. They have argued that
immigrants in search of opportunity are unusually able, energetic, and ambitious,
and therefore will be assets to the American economy. Advocates have also argued
that immigrants are a cultural asset, enriching American life through their diver-
sity-though few have taken the position that this diversity should be deliberately
preserved.
The traditional argument for a generous and open immigration policy has
rested on certain assumptions about the immigrants themselves: that they are
worthy, productive, and socially desirable, that they will easily adapt to American
life, and that their impact upon our society will be minimal and favorable. This
argument has also rested on certain assumptions about the United States: that it
should be a haven for the oppressed, that it has room and resources for additional
people, and that it is strong enough to absorb large numbers of foreigners without
endangering its own society and institutions. Restrictionists have not shared these
assumptions.
Advocates of a restrictive immigration policy have argued that immigration
endangers the nation's economic, political, and cultural welfare. From the Puri-
tans of colonial New England who objected to sharing food with Scotch-Irish new-
comers, to taxpayers in Texas who now object to educating the children of illegal
Mexican aliens, restrictionists have worried that immigrants would use resources
needed by American citizens. Despite its often-expressed ideal of worker soli-
darity, the American labor movement has often opposed immigration on the
grounds that immigrant labor takes American jobs and depresses American
wages. 2
Restrictionists have also argued that, because of their ignorance of the Amer-
ican political system, their ethnic or religious backgrounds, or their ideological
affiliations, immigrants constitute a threat to the nation's political institutions.
From the 17th and 18th century protests against the arrival of British felons to
more recent protests against the arrival of former inmates of Cuban jails, oppo-
nents of immigration have warned of immigrant criminality. More importantly,
restrictionists have argued that massive infusions of alien beliefs, customs, and
genes would undermine the nation's unity, destroy its cultural identity, and mon-
grelize its population. Unlike their opponents, restrictionists have assumed that
immigrants are by definition the worst rather than the best of their nation, and
that they can assimilate only with great difficulty, if at all. Restrictionists have
assumed that the United States is limited in resources, unable to support addi-
tional population, and vulnerable to subversion and corruption by outsiders who
would change it before it changed them.
2. See J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 70-
72, 305-06 (1955); see also E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POUCY
1798-1965, at 493-94 (1981).
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III
THE ARGUMENTS APPLIED: THREE IMMIGRATION POLICY DEBATES
The opposing arguments outlined above have been voiced in varying fashions
throughout American history. The three case studies that follow will demonstrate
how the arguments were expressed in specific policy debates and embodied in
America's immigration policy. In the first two instances, taken from the mid-18th
and the 19th centuries, respectively, efforts to change a pre-existing open immigra-
tion policy failed. In the third case, that of the early 20th century, the open policy
was drastically changed. A numerical limit was placed on immigration from
outside the western hemisphere and a quota system was established that discrimi-
nated in the admission of individuals on the basis of racial and ethnic background.
A. The Colonial Debate: 1720-1776
Despite the presence of Native Americans, blacks, Dutchmen, and others,
inhabitants of the Thirteen Colonies were predominantly English at the beginning
of the 18th century. In the decades that followed, the immigration of hundreds of
thousands of Germans and Scotch-Irish led to the first major debate on immigra-
tion policy. The Germans, victims of religious and political oppression and of the
devastation of many wars, came from the Rhineland. 3 The Scotch-Irish were
Scots who had settled in Ireland but departed because of religious restrictions (as
Presbyterians they were dissenters from the established Church of England), and
because of a rapid rise in rents. 4 The Germans settled mostly in the middle Colo-
nies, constituting over a third of the population of Pennsylvania by mid-century,
while the Scotch-Irish were more widely distributed and often found their way to
the frontier.
The British government and its representatives in the Colonies advocated the
admission of virtually all Protestant immigrants. Since the founding of the Colo-
nies, British authorities had encouraged immigration because they needed a labor
force to produce wealth and consumers to provide a market for exports from the
mother country. With this in mind, the British government granted easy naturali-
zation to non-English immigrants and provided pardons and free transportation to
the Colonies for criminals and debtors. Motivated by a desire to provide refuge for
persecuted co-religionists as well as to populate his colony, William Penn traveled
to Germany to recruit settlers for Pennsylvania. For similar reasons Queen Anne
(and later King George) encouraged and financed the emigration of German Prot-
estants. 5 Emigration was also promoted by private parties, ship captains, and
agents who made handsome profits from the traffic in imported indentured
servants.
6
Recognizing the economic value of greater population, colonial governors and
3. See generally W. BEIDELMAN, THE STORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA GERMANS (1898); A. FAUST, THE
GERMAN ELEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1927).
4. See generally H. FORD, THE SCOTCH-IRISH IN AMERICA (1915); J. LEYBURN, THE SCOTCH-IRISH:
A SOCIAL HISTORY (1962).
5. E. PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 1, 47 (Stud. Hist. Econ. & Pub. L. No. 12, 1967).
6. W. BEIDELMAN, supra note 3, at 43-44.
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legislative assemblies competed to attract immigrants, offering inducements such
as cash bounties, free land, tax exemptions, and at least limited religious tolera-
tion. 7 All Christians--except Catholics-were acceptable. In 1738 the Lieutenant
Governor of Pennsylvania asked for an appropriation to build a hospital for
German immigrants. If German immigration were slowed or halted, he warned
the legislators, "the value of your lands will fall and your advances to wealth be
much slower, for it is not altogether the goodness of the soil, but the number and
industry of the people that make a flourishing country."8
The ambivalence of colonial settlers, as opposed to royal officials, toward non-
English immigration is suggested by the initial refusal by the Pennsylvania
assembly to provide the proposed hospital. The assembly rejected the Lieutenant
Governor's equation of German immigration with prosperity, attributing the pro-
gress of the colony "chiefly to the lenity of our government, and to the sobriety and
industry of the first settlers of this country and the other British subjects inhabiting
the same." 9
Opponents of unrestricted German and Scotch-Irish immigration raised essen-
tially the same economic, political, and cultural arguments that were to become
the staples of the restrictionists' case in the centuries that followed. In the
preindustrial colonial economy, however, the economic arguments centered on the
scarcity of resources rather than on wage competition. In 1718 Bostonians blamed
Scotch-Irish immigrants for the shortage of food in the colony and for the rising
cost of grain. In 1729 Boston mobs prevented the landing of ships from Ireland for
the same reason.' 0
As memories of "starving times" faded and resources became more plentiful,
economic arguments became secondary to political and cultural ones. Colonists
worried that German immigrants did not understand English government and
would therefore undermine it; that being unaccustomed to freedom they would
abuse it; and that because they "live in a Body together, as if in a Principality of
Germany," they would throw off their loyalty to the British crown or, in case of
war, side with Britian's traditional enemy, France.1 ' The last fear was fed in
Pennsylvania by the Germans' refusal to vote funds for a strong militia to protect
the colony against the French and the Indians, a project most Germans considered
a threat to their sons and their pocketbooks. 12 In 1744 the Governor of New York
ordered the colony's Moravians, a German Protestant sect, to dissolve their mis-
sions to the Indians, mistakenly believing the missionaries to be Catholic priests
and French agents-and therefore doubly enemies of the state.' 3
Arguments against the immigration of Germans stressed their supposed stu-
7. E. PROPER, supra note 5, at 11-17.
8. Id at 51.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. T. CURRAN, XENOPHOBIA AND IMMIGRATION 1820-1930, at 13 (1975).
11. K. WUST, THE VIRGINIA GERMANS 52 (1969) (quoting colonial Virginia Governor Dinwiddie
from I THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ROBERT DINWIDDIE 213 (Brock ed. 1884)).
12. Weaver, Benjamin Franklin and the Pennsylvania Germans, in THE ALIENS: A HISTORY OF ETHNIC
MINORITIES IN AMERICA 49-51 (1970).
13. Id. at 54.
Page 137: Spring 19821
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
pidity, clannishness, and dubious assimilability. "I really think they [seem] to be
as ignorant a Set of People as the Indians. [T]hey would never speak English but
when spoken to they speak all Dutch," complained George Washington in 1738.14
Benjamin Franklin concurred, "Those who come here are generally the most
stupid of their own nation."' '15 Franklin was also explicit about his fears of cultural
inundation:
[W]hy should the Palatine Boors be suffered to swarm into our Settlements and, by herding
together, establish their Language and Manners, to the Exclusion of ours? Why should
Pennsylvania, founded by the Enghsh, become a Colony of Ahens, who will shortly be so
numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them .... 16
Opposition to the admission of the Scotch-Irish centered on their poverty and
their supposed tendencies toward disorder and violence. Protests against the immi-
gration of felons of any ethnic background were common. "Our Mother [Britain]
knows what is best for us," noted a colonial newspaper sarcastically:
What is a little Housebreaking, Shoplifting, or Highway Robbing; what is a Son now and then
corrupted and hang'd, a Daughter debauch'd and pox'd, a Wife stabb'd, a Husband's Throat cut,
or a Child's Brains beat out with an Axe, compar'd with this "IMPROVEMENT and WELL
PEOPLING of the Colonies." 17
The restrictionist arguments reflected realities about colonial life, although not
necessarily about the Germans or Scotch-Irish. Localized food shortages did occur
and could have been aggravated in the short run by the arrival of impoverished
immigrants. The Indians and the French on the frontier posed a genuine danger,
as the French and Indian War would soon demonstrate. Many of the Germans
did avoid political involvement and officeholding, as well as taxation for a militia,
due to their prior experiences with authorities in the homeland or their religious
beliefs. By the end of the French and Indian War in 1763, however, the German
community was contributing its share to the common defense.
The characterization of Germans as "stupid" was no more than an expression
of English colonial ethnocentrism. Franklin and others who held this prejudice
could have observed much evidence to the contrary; indeed, Franklin himself com-
mented on the number of German books and printing houses in Pennsylvania. 8
Fear of a permanent German subculture was more justifiable, since German had
in fact become an unofficial second language in Pennsylvania. Franklin could not
have known that by the end of the century, the Germans (with the exception of the
most conservative religious sects) would be speaking English and integrating them-
selves into the commercial and social life of the English community. Fears of
Scotch-Irish violence also proved unfounded. As the Scotch-Irish gained social
status and affluence they became as "respectable" as the English-from whom
they were soon virtually indistinguishable.1 9
14. K. WUST, supra note 11, at 51-52.
15. W. BEIDELMAN, supra note 3, at 85 (quoting Franklin's letter to English botanist Peter Collinson
in 1753).
16. 3 WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 72 (A. Smyth ed. 1907).
17. Pennsylvania Gazette (B. Franklin ed.), May 9, 1751, at 2, col. 1.
18. W. BEIDELMAN, supra note 3, at 86.
19. See J. LEYBURN, THE SCOTCH-IRISH: A SOCIAL HISTORY 317 (1962).
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In sum, the English colonists in a new and insecure frontier society had justifi-
able fears: fear of the French-traditional rivals on their borders; fear of the
Indians-whose lands they were seizing; and fear that the wilderness would radi-
cally change the way of life they had laboriously brought from England. These
problems, however, would have existed with or without the Germans and the
Scotch-Irish-at whose doorstep colonial difficulties were all too often simplisti-
cally laid.
The ability of the colonists to translate their fears into restrictionist legislation
was limited by the structure of colonial government. Most colonial assemblies had
to contend with royal governors, and all were subject to the authority of the
Crown and Parliament. Unable to stop foreign immigration directly, colonial
assemblies tried to discourage it through indirect means; they enacted special
taxes, land restrictions, and religion-based voting qualifications to discourage the
immigration of Catholics. 20 British authorities upheld this legislation; Catholicism
was only reluctantly tolerated in England and the national enemies-France and
Spain-were Catholic. Nevertheless, colonial efforts to reduce the immigration of
the Germans and the Scotch-Irish, by levying a head tax on each immigrant, or by
requiring ship captains to post bond for all passengers, were not successful. In
Pennsylvania, where the English majority would probably have stopped German
immigration if possible, 2' royal governors vetoed restrictive taxes on several occa-
sions. 22 Moreover, Pennsylvania's German community was so large and well-
organized by mid-century that it was able not only to help block restrictions,2 3 but
also to secure legislation protecting the health, safety, and legal rights of immi-
grants during passage. 24
Ironically, by the time of the American Revolution the British authorities and
the colonists had reversed their positions on immigration. After 1763, British
authorities began to limit immigration because settlement of the West made the
colonies harder to defend. In 1774, Parliament cut off immigration to the colonies
entirely. 25 The colonists, on the other hand, were by now so thoroughly convinced
that immigration meant growth and prosperity that the British domestic policy of
restricting emigration was listed in the Declaration of Independence as one of the
reasons for breaking political ties with the mother country. Political leaders still
occasionally expressed concern about the political reliability of immigrants2 6 and
declared the need for their assimilation into English colonial culture. Nevertheless,
the United States began its career as an independent nation with a totally open
20. T. CURRAN, supra note 10, at 12-13.
21. PROPER, supra note 5, at 52.
22. Id. at 53.
23. Id at 52-53.
In 1755, the Governor of Pennsylvania vetoed "An act for preventing the importation of Germans or
other passengers in too great numbers in any ship," arguing that it amounted to an absolute prohibition of
Germans "which might not look well at home nor be for the interest of the province." Id. at 53.
24. A. FAUST, THE GERMAN ELEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 71-72 (1927).
25. See T. CURRAN, supra note 10, at 14.
26. Quotations to this effect from the writings of George Washington, John Adams, Patrick Henry,
Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and other Founding Fathers have been cited in many restrictionist
works. For a representative selection, see THE ALIEN IN OUR MIDST, OR "SELLING OUR BIRTHRIGHT FOR
A MESS OF INDUSTRIAL POTrAGE" (M. Grant & C. Davison eds. 2d ed. 1930).
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immigration policy. There were no qualitative restrictions. The waiting period
for naturalization was only two years27 (changed to five years in 1795).28 The
Constitution denied no national office except the Presidency to the foreign born.
B. Antebellum Nativism: 1830-1860
Half a century later, this open-door policy was vociferously, albeit unsuccess-
fully, challenged. By the mid-1850's, members of nativist organizations were
pledging never to support a "foreigner" for public office. A national political
party was electing Congressmen who advocated a twenty-one year waiting period
for naturalization. Some restrictionists were suggesting that the gates be closed
altogether.
Like its colonial predecessor, the antebellum debate was touched off by a
sudden increase in the number of immigrants. The 1820's saw 150,000 immigrants
enter the country, a number which quadrupled in the 1830's, rose to more than
1,500,000 in the 184 0's, and peaked at nearly 2,500,000 in the 1850's. On the eve
of the Civil War, one out of every seven Americans was either an immigrant or the
child of an immigrant. 29 Most of these newcomers were Irish Catholics, Germans
(many of them also Catholic), Scandinavians, and Chinese-people whose reli-
gion, language, or ethnic background differed from the white Anglo-Saxon Protes-
tant American norm. The intensified public debate was a response to these
differences as well as to the increasing numbers of new immigrants. It also
expressed the deeper tensions of a nation undergoing many rapid changes simulta-
neously: expansion, urbanization, industrialization, reform, and the sectional con-
flict that would soon erupt in civil war.
Some of the immigrants were refugees from political upheavals-the Polish
immigrants of 1830, for example, and the famous German "48'ers." More were
fugitives from the potato famine that blighted Ireland and areas of northern
Europe. Most, however, were land-hungry farmers or displaced laborers,
craftsmen, or petty tradesmen seeking better economic opportunities for them-
selves and their children.3 0
Support for an open immigration policy was strong, though not always vocal.
Many Americans sympathized with the refugees and famine victims, and saw their
coming as confirmation of the widespread conviction that the United States was in
every way superior to Old World countries. With cities doubling their size every
decade and a seemingly limitless expanse of western land to settle, immigrants
were welcomed as a source of labor. Like the Colonies a century' earlier, southern
and western states actively recruited immigrants; greater population increased
their representation in Congress, swelled tax receipts, introduced skills, and
increased land values. 3i Business interests also supported and encouraged immi-
gration. Railroads were especially active in recruitment; in addition to laying the
27. Act of Mar. 26, 1790 (1 Stat. 103).
28. Act of Jan. 29, 1795 (1 Stat. 414).
29. A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT 375 (1944).
30. Se L. DINNERSTEIN & D. REIMERS, supra note 1, at 12-16; M. SELLER, supra note 1, at 58-64.
31. M. SELLER, supra note 1, at 64-66.
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rails, immigrants bought land from the railroads, paid fares to reach the new terri-
tories, and then used the railroads to bring in supplies and to market their crops.
Restrictionists revived colonial protests that immigrants used up scarce
resources in their complaints that immigrants inordinately relied upon charitable
institutions and drained the nation of capital by sending money to their relatives
overseas. The beginnings of urbanization and industrialization, however, shifted
the focus of the economic argument to wage and job competition 32 and to issues of
class conflict. An 1856 publication, Immigraton." Its Evils and Consequences, warned
that "by depreciating the value of American labor" immigrants increased the
power of American and British capitalists, who "rule the money market of the
world."133 In 1852 a group of white miners in California, worried about Chinese
competition, adopted a resolution denouncing the "capitalists, shipowners, and
merchants" who encouraged Chinese immigration and urging that "no Asiatic or
South Sea Islander be permitted to mine in this district . ...
While economically motivated protests usually peaked during periodic reces-
sions or "panics," politically and religiously motivated protests were more sus-
tained. Americans were self-consciously proud of their unique political system,
and worried that immigrants would undermine it through ignorance, corruption,
or even conspiracy. Uncertain as yet of the consequences of universal white male
suffrage, the "better," propertied classes worried that radical 48'ers would lead the
nation to socialism and anarchy and that vote selling among the new Irish voters
in the cities would result in a hopelessly corrupt urban government-and in the
defeat of the Whigs by the Irish-supported Democrats.
The most widespread political fear, however, was of subversion through
Roman Catholicism, the religion of half the German and virtually all the Irish
immigrants. Catholicism was associated in the minds of many Protestant Ameri-
cans with France and Spain, traditional enemies of the British and their dependen-
cies during the colonial period and suppressors of liberal revolutions in Europe and
Latin America in the 19th century. At a time when militant Protestantism was the
bastion of militant Americanism, Catholic leaders here and in Europe announced
their intention to proselytize in the United States. Even as militant Americans
were hailing their newly established public schools as the bulwark of the republic,
Bishop John Hughes of New York led a campaign to raise public money for Cath-
olic schools. 35 Lurid anti-Catholic literature flooded the nation and became an
important component of the demand for a change in immigration policy.
Inventor Samuel F.B. Morse warned that immigrants were agents of the Pope,
who had sent them to prepare for a Catholic takeover of the United States. "Will
you be longer deceived by the pensioned Jesuits . . .? Fly to protect the vulner-
able places of your Constitution and Laws. Place your guards; you will need them,
32. A. TYLER, supra note 29, at 376, 386; see also R. BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-
1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVIsM 334 (1964).
33. S. BUSEY, IMMIGRATION: ITS EviLS AND CONSEQUENCES 82, 81 (2d ed. 1969)(lst ed. New York
1856).
34. A. MCLEOD, PIGTAILS AND GOLD DUST 67 (1947).
35. D. RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 46-57 (1974); see aho Lannie, Catholcs, Protestants, and
Pubhc Education, in CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA 52 (P. Gleason ed. 1970).
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and quickly, too. And first, shut your gates."'36
Advocates of immigration restriction produced documents which indicated
that foreign governments were "dumping" criminals and paupers in the United
States. These restrictionists assembled figures on the number of immigrants in
urban prisons, insane asylums, and poorhouses-all proof that these were the worst
their homelands had to offer. 37 Evangelists and moral reformers viewed immigra-
tion as an obstacle to their crusade for a pure, clean, sober, Sabbath-observing,
Protestant America. The Chinese were denounced as treacherous, licentious hea-
thens addicted to opium, infanticide, gangsterism, and filth. 38 The Irish were only
slightly less vilified: "[S]o filthy and ignorant a mass of humanity we have never
seen on the face of the earth," wrote one hostile observer. 39 Another asked, "Can
one throw mud into pure water and not disturb its clearness?" '40 The dismal living
conditions in the new urban slums offered further "proof" of immigrant
depravity. 4 1
In retrospect, most of these restrictionist arguments appear to have been based
on misconceptions. There were periods of localized unemployment, particularly in
northeastern cities where unskilled, American-born labor competed with immi-
grants. Unemployment among skilled workers, however, reflected technological
change and the fluctuations of a rapidly changing economy more than it did the
presence of immigrants. Despite periodic "panics," real wages did not decline
during the decades before the Civil War, the economy expanded, and native-born
workers could rise to better-paying positions, leaving the work they did not want to
the incoming immigrants. 4 2
Restrictionists were correct in arguing that foreign governments were sending
criminals and paupers to the United States, 43 but tended to exaggerate their num-
bers and impact. Nativists were also correct in noting the widespread dependency
of immigrants in the East upon public charity,44 but incorrect in attributing this to
depravity rather than to poverty. Crime, prostitution, drunkenness, and Sabbath-
breaking predated the coming of the immigrants, as did urban political corrup-
tion; the reformers' crusades were thwarted by the native-born as well as by the
foreigner.
As one historian has noted, "[fjundamentally the aliens were opposed because
they were Catholics rather than because they were paupers or criminals."'4 5 Much
of the apprehension about immigration reflected Protestant distress at the dra-
matic growth of American Catholicism. The Catholic population increased from
36. S.F.B. MORSE, IMMINENT DANGERS TO THE FREE INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
THROUGH FOREIGN IMMIGRATION 25 (New York 1835) (published under pseudonym "An American").
37. S. BUSEY, supra note 33, at 66-76.
38. S. MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE AMERICAN IMAGE OF THE CHINESE 68 (1969).
39. N.Y. Am. Republican, July 8, 1844, at 2, quoted in T. CURRAN, supra note 10, at 36.
40. S.F.B. MORSE, supra note 36, at iv.
41. For a vivid description of these conditions, see R. ERNST, IMMIGRANT LIFE IN NEW YORK CITY
1825-1863 (1949).
42. Set R. BILLINGTON, supra note 32, at 334-35.
43. See id. at 34-36, 134.
44. Id. at 324.
45. Id at 36.
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about 75,000 (or 1% of the nation) in 1810, to 3,000,000 (or 10%) in 1860.46
Poverty, not the Papacy, sent Irish Catholics to the United States. The old
world Catholic monarchies-reactionary as they may have been-were scarcely
able to maintain order in Europe, much less present a credible threat to the United
States. Neither the public school system nor Protestantism was in jeopardy. The
anti-Irish, anti-Catholic hysteria must be attributed to demagoguery, to inherited
prejudices, and to a young nation's need to confirm its identity as a Protestant,
Anglo-Saxon republic by perceiving "threats" posed by monarchical, Catholic
enemies at home as well as abroad.
The decades from 1830 to 1860 were marked by frequent rioting between
immigrant Democrats and native-born Whigs at election time and by occasional
attacks on Catholic immigrants and institutions. An Ursaline convent and school
in Massachusetts were burned in 1834.41 Several people were killed and many
more were wounded during street fighting in Philadelphia ten years later.48
Dozens of nativist "patriotic" societies were formed and in the early 1850's a
national political party, the American (or "Know-Nothing") Party emerged. In
1854, this nativist party carried Massachusetts and Delaware and sent seventy-five
Congressmen to Washington-"pledged to carry the nation into a war against the
Pope and his minions."' 49 A year later the American Party gained control of
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, and Kentucky and made
substantial gains in New York, Pennsylvania, and California. 50
Surprisingly, none of this activity resulted in any change in the nation's liberal
immigration policy. Congressional efforts to discourage immigration by increasing
the naturalization period to twenty-one years failed, 5 1 as did efforts to forbid the
immigration of illiterates, criminals, and paupers.5 2 Many Congressmen who
favored immigration restriction did not vote for it, fearing that the enlargement of
the limited powers of the Federal Government in this area might set a precedent
for federal legislation against slavery. At the state level, action was directed to
fruitless investigations of convents and, in Massachusetts, to short-lived constitu-
tional amendments which confined officeholding to the native-born and limited
the vote to persons residing in the country for at least twenty-one years.53 The
early electoral victories of the American Party were not repeated after 1856, and
by 1860 the party was dead, along with its restrictionist agenda.5 4
Excessive zeal and internal corruption had weakened the party, but its defeat
was accelerated by other factors. The party had been strongest in New England-
where Irish immigrants were numerous and the disruptions of early industrializa-
tion most strongly felt-and in border states-where moderates were looking for
46. A. TYLER, supra note 29, at 361.
47. Id. at 370-71.
48. Id. at 380-81.
49. T. CURRAN, supra note 10, at 338.
50. Id.
51. R. BILLINGTON, supra note 32, at 410-11.
52. Id at 411-12.
53. Id at 413. These Massachusetts constitutional amendments were soon repealed by a later state
legislature. Id
54. Id at 430.
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an alternative to national parties polarized over the issue of slavery. Restric-
tionism held little appeal for voters in the West, where immigration meant growth
and prosperity.
Neither the Federal Government nor the states had been inclined to limit
immigration in the 1830's and 1840's, because these were decades of territorial and
economic expansion. The era of biological racism had not yet arrived. Most
people were optimistic about America's future and confident that unlimited num-
bers of immigrants (with the possible exception of the Chinese) could be assimi-
lated by means of the frontier, the public school, and other obviously superior
American conditions and institutions. In the 1850's, the controversy over slavery
in the territories increasingly dominated all other issues. The American Party, the
last antebellum movement to focus on an issue that was national rather than sec-
tional, could not succeed. As the decade progressed the party, like the rest of the
country, divided along sectional lines. The real issue facing the country was
slavery, not immigration.
C. Toward the National Origins Quota: 1882-1924
A dramatic change in the nation's previously open immigration policy began
in 1882 with the exclusion of most Chinese immigrants 55 and culminated in 1924
with the exclusion of all Asian and African immigrants and the sharp limitation of
southern and eastern Europeans. 56 Advocates of the new policy attributed its
adoption to changes in the quality of immigration. Historians have found, how-
ever, that in motivation, skills, and adjustment problems, the "new" immigrants
differed little from earlier arrivals. The country that received them was different,
however. No longer a relatively isolated rural society, the United States was
emerging as a world power, an industrial giant, and a nation of cities. Ironically,
these changes were accompanied by a loss of the self-confidence and optimism that
had supported the policy of unrestricted immigration.
As had been the case in the antebellum period, the turn of the century debate
about immigration policy was precipitated by a sharp increase in the number of
immigrants. Total immigration in the three decades preceding the Civil War had
numbered 5,000,000. Between 1860 and 1890 that number doubled, and from
1890 to 1914 it tripled, with over 1,000,000 entering annually in 1905, 1906, 1907,
1910, 1913, and 1914.5 7 By 1920 almost 60% of the population of cities of over
100,000 consisted of the foreign-born or their children.5 8 While most antebellum
immigrants had been from northern and western Europe, by 1907 80% had emi-
grated from southern and eastern Europe.59 Early 20th century immigration
included large numbers of Italians, Jews, Poles, and other Slavs, and smaller num-
bers from Japan, Mexico, Canada, and the West Indies.6°
55. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
56. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
57. M. SELLER, supra note 1, at 104-05.
58. D. WARD, CITIES AND IMMIGRANTS 52 (1971).
59. M. SELLER, supra note 1, at 105.
60. See L. DINNERSTEIN & D. REIMERS, supra note 1, at 36-39, 162-65.
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The forces that favored a continuation of open immigration were varied and,
until after World War I, strong enough to prevent a decisive change in immigra-
tion policy toward Europeans, if riot toward Asians. Prior to the war, humanita-
rian motives remained important; many Americans were sympathetic to the plight
of Jews fleeing savage pogroms in Russia and Armenians escaping massacres in
Turkey. Among intellectuals and social workers there was sincere, if sometimes
condescending, support on the ground that ethnic neighborhoods were colorful
and quaint or, more substantially, that immigrant cultures enriched American
life. 6 1 Home missionaries in the new metropolitan centers favored continued
immigration as an opportunity to win souls for Protestantism. 62 At times Catholic
leadership, reflecting the heavy immigrant composition of the Church, expressed
unofficial opposition to efforts to restrict immigration. 63 Politicians in ethnic dis-
tricts vied with one another in expressing support for continued immigration, as
did the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive parties in the presidential elec-
tion of 1912.64 More importantly and more consistently, the immigrant communi-
ties themselves sought to keep the doors of immigration open. Organizations such
as the Polish National Alliance, the German-American Alliance, and the Amer-
ican Jewish Committee held mass meetings, circulated petitions, and sent dele-
gates to Congressional hearings on immigration policy.65
The most influential group to support continued open immigration during
most of this period was American business. A second-rate industrial power at mid-
century, the United States was by 1890 the world's leading industrial power. Its
manufactured goods were almost equal in value to those of England, France, and
Germany combined; its railroad mileage was greater than that of all Europe,
including Russia. Except in the South, immigrants formed the largest segment of
the labor force for this unprecedented expansion. 66 Immigration guaranteed an
ample and inexpensive supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labor, and enabled
industrialists to thwart efforts at unionization by pitting immigrant against native-
born or one ethnic group against another. As late as 1921, the southwestern cotton
growers, the Colorado beet producers, the National Federation of Construction
Industries, and the National Association of Manufacturers all opposed the institu-
tion of restrictive quotas. 67
Ironically, the enormous industrial expansion that was fueled in part by immi-
grant energies contributed significantly to the imposition of restrictions. Unprece-
dented growth was punctuated by unprecedented panics, and by a sustained
major depression in the 1890's in which perhaps one-fifth of the workforce was
unemployed. Strikes to protest the lowering of wages were violently suppressed.
61. Among those who wrote sympathetically and at times even romantically about ethnic ghettos
were journalists Hutchins Hapgood and Lincoln Steffens, novelist William Dean Howells, and social
worker Robert Woods, who organized the National Foundation of Settlements.
62. See Seller, Protestant Evangehrm and the Italian Immigrant Woman 1890-1920, in THE ITALIAN IMMI-
GRANT WOMAN IN NORTH AMERICA 124 (B. Caroli ed. 1978).
63. See J. HIGHAM, supra note 2, at 188.
64. Id. at 189.
65. Id at 188.
66. J. BLUM, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 437-38, 456 (1968).
67. J. HIGHAM, supra note 2, at 310.
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The ever increasing concentration of wealth and power in the hands of giant cor-
porations, along with the announcement in 1890 that the frontier was officially
closed, made many ordinary Americans feel, for the first time, that their opportu-
nities for the pursuit of wealth were limited and that therefore America had no
room for further newcomers. 6
Not surprisingly, American labor-including many of the foreign-born-pro-
tested that immigrants were taking American jobs, serving as strikebreakers, and
working for wages unacceptable to American labor. Irish-born Dennis Kearney, a
founder and board member of the Workingman's Trade and Labor Union of San
Francisco, led the fight to halt Chinese immigration in the aftermath of the depres-
sion of 1877.69 In the 1880's, the Knights of Labor urged a ban on the importation
of contract labor.70 The newly organized American Federation of Labor vacil-
lated in the 1890's, but moved solidly into the restrictionist camp by 1907.71
Although an organization called the American Protective Association revived
antebellum arguments that Catholic immigrants endangered the public schools
and the republic,7 2 anti-Catholicism had lost much of its emotional power. Not to
be deprived of their appeals to religious fanaticism, restrictionists could also invoke
anti-Semitism. Beleaguered farmers and workers blamed their economic distress
on international monied interests symbolized by Jews; the respectable middle class
reviled Jewish "aggressiveness." In the 1920's, Henry Ford of automotive fame
warned, through a magazine available at his auto dealerships, of an international
Jewish conspiracy.7 3
Economically based arguments against immigration had largely subsided with
the return of prosperity at the end of the century, but political fears increased as
World War I approached. Even before the United States entered the war,
attempts on the part of the German-American community to influence the
nation's pro-British foreign policy aroused a storm of protest. About one-third of
all the foreign born in the United States were from Germany, the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire, or Turkey. Once the United States entered the war, these immi-
grants became "enemy aliens" and potential saboteurs. "Reckon each as a pound
of dynamite-surely a modest comparison," wrote Samuel Hopkins Adams. "Not
all these enemy aliens are hostile. Not all dynamite explodes."'74
The jingoistic atmosphere of World War I led to a campaign against "hyphen-
ation" and for "100 percent Americanism." This focused attention on the fact that
many immigrants lived in ethnic communities, maintained a lifestyle different
from mainstream America and, especially in the immediate postwar peiod, lobbied
actively for a peace settlement favorable to their native lands. The perceived
68. See T. CURRAN, Supra note 10, at 93; M. SELLER, supra note 1, at 199.
69. T. CURRAN, supra note 10, at 84.
70. J. HIGHAM, supra note 2, at 48.
71. Id. at 71-72, 163.
72. J. HIGHAM, supra note 2, at 80-87.
73. Id. at 282-83.
74. Adams, Invaded America, EVERYBODY'S MAGAZINE, March 1918, at 55-56, quoted in J. HIGHAM,
supra note 2, at 214.
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failure of crash campaigns to "Americanize" these millions led many to conclude
in the early 1920's that immigration policy should be radically altered.
Fear of immigrant radicalism had erupted much earlier with the Haymarket
bombing in 1886 and had run through the strikes and labor unrest of the depres-
sion decade that followed. It gained momentum when socialists, many of them
foreign born, opposed America's participation in World War I, and it reached a
peak during the Red Scare, the strikes, and the recession of the immediate postwar
years. In the Palmer Raids of 1919 and 1920, thousands of aliens-mostly Jews,
Italians, and Slavs-were arrested and deported as anarchist or Bolshevik revolu-
tionaries, often on the flimsiest of evidence. 75 The stereotyping of southern and
eastern Europeans as radicals was a major factor in the greater restrictionist vic-
tory that was to come. 76
The familiar cultural and moral arguments concerning immigrant filth, crime,
sin, and political corruption reappeared. Like the reformers of the antebellum
generation, 20th century progressives turned to restriction as a tool in their cam-
paigns for urban reform and Prohibition.
Arguments that immigrants caused cultural or moral contamination were'old;
arguments that they caused racial contamination were new, a product of the scien-
tific age. By the late 19th century, widespread acceptance of the germ theory had
led to concern that immigrants were a menace to public health. Restrictionists
warned Congress that importation of Chinese labor into California introduced
"frightful and nameless [sic] diseases and contagions" such as "Asian" cholera,
"Chinese" syphilis, and leprosy.7 7 Throughout the nation, foreign-born servants
were suspected of infecting the households of the comfortable.
Although the faults of earlier immigrant groups had been attributed to their
environment and had thus been thought correctable, the new physical and social
sciences emphasized the hereditary (and therefore immutable) nature of the same
defects. Anthropologists, psychologists, physicians, and others demonstrated "sci-
entifically"-by measuring skulls and forehead angles to compute cranial
capacity-that Slavs and Italians were less intelligent than Scots and Norwegians,
and that Asians and blacks were the least intelligent of all. 78 The inferiority of the
"new" immigrants was confirmed by intelligence tests given in the Army during
World War I and soon after in the schools, where children of Polish and Italian
immigrants tended to score five to fifteen points lower than their mainstream
American counterparts. 79 Educator Clifford Kirkpatrick warned, on the basis of
such tests, that recent immigration was lowering the nation's collective intelligence
75. See R. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA 1919-1920, at 210-22 (1955).
76. See id. at 265.
77. See S. MILLER, supra note 38, at 164-65.
78. See J. HIGHAM, supra note 2, at 131-57.
79. See C. KIRKPATRICK, INTELLIGENCE AND IMMIGRATION 15-35 (Mental Measurement Mono-
graph No. 2, 1926).
Kirkpatrick's monograph collects a variety of contemporary studies which employed varying methodol-
ogies (from the Stanford-Binet I.Q. test to more subjective "rates of retardation") in a variety of settings
(from the armed forces to the public schools). These studies generally "demonstrated" deficient intelli-
gence on the part of southern and eastern European immigrants and blacks, as compared with "Ameri-
cans" and immigrants from more Nordic climes.
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and urged a more restrictive, "scientific" immigration policy. Kirkpatrick and
others pointed with alarm to the fact that the supposedly inferior groups were
reproducing faster than old-stock Americans, thus compounding the gloomy prog-
nosis of national genetic decline.8 0
Time has not vindicated Kirkpatrick and other advocates of theories of genetic
inferiority. Recent census studies8 l indicate that descendants of supposedly
inferior Asians and southern and eastern Europeans have achieved educational
and income levels at or above the national average. For that matter, even contem-
poraries of Kirkpatrick were aware of the role played by cultural bias in intelli-
gence testing and of the questionable correlation between cranial capacity and
intellectual capacity.8 2
From the perspective of over half a century later, the arguments of restriction-
ists between 1882 and 1924 seem, like their earlier counterparts, a mixture of half-
truth and fantasy. Immigration was clearly an asset rather than a liability to the
economy, supporting the expansion of established industries such as steel and
mining, and creating new ones such as readymade clothing. Despite periodic
unemployment, the era as a whole was characterized, as was the early 19th cen-
tury, by a labor shortage, not a labor surplus. Native-born labor moved up, not
out, as immigrants moved into the heavy, dirty, and unskilled jobs that their pred-
ecessors no longer wanted. Moreover, because immigrant labor expanded and con-
tracted with the business cycle (almost 40% of the immigrants during this period
returned to their homelands permanently, and many went back and forth as
"birds of passage"), immigrant labor helped to minimize job instability for the
native born. 3
Tales of Jewish or Papal plots were pure fabrication and demagoguery. Per-
haps motivated by economic expediency, Henry Ford eventually retracted his
anti-Semitic charges.8 4 Fears of immigrant sabotage during World War I were
equally unfounded-a byproduct of wartime hysteria. Immigrants served in the
armed forces in proportionately greater numbers than their native-born counter-
parts.8 5 Immigrants did participate in strikes and some-like other Americans-
responded to economic inequality by becoming socialists or anarchists. The over-
whelming majority, however, wanted to join the capitalist system, not to over-
throw it. Finally, although violent strikes and the bomb scares of the postwar
years frightened the nation, the radical element was so small and its views so alien
80. Id. at 112, 108-10; see also Clark, Btrth Rate and Native Intelligence, 14 PSYCHOLOGICAL CLINIC 111-
17 (1922); Davie, Immigration and the Declining Birthrate, 19 ScI. MONTHLY 68-76 (1924).
81. See Sowell, Race andIQ. Reconsidered, in ESSAYS AND DATA ON AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 203-38
(T. Sowell ed. 1978) and Sowell & Collins, Statistical Data on American Ethnic Groups, in ESSAYS AND DATA
ON AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 251-415 (T. Sowell ed. 1978).
82. See, e.g., Arlitt, On the Need for Caution in Establishing Race Norms, 5 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 179
(1921); Davidson, The Social Sgnifwance of the Army Intelligence Findings, 16 SCI. MONTHLY 184 (1923); Saer,
An Inquiry into the Efect of Bilingualism upon the Intelligence of Young Children, J. EXPERIMENTAL PEDAGOGY 266
(1922).
83. For an excellent contemporary critique of the economic argument against immigration, see I.
HOURWICH, IMMIGRATION AND LABOR (1912).
84. See J. HIGHAM, supra note 2, at 327.
85. Id at 216.
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to mainstream thinking that no real danger existed.86
Dirt, overcrowding, and other unpleasant conditions did exist in immigrant
neighborhoods, to the dismay of the residents as well as their critics; but, contrary
to popular belief, crime was lower among immigrants than among the native
born.8 7 The physical and social problems prevalent in the living quarters of the
''new" immigrants were due to poverty and inadequate urban services rather than
to the inferiority of their southern and eastern European inhabitants. Similar
problems plagued the neighborhoods of both the native-born poor and immigrant
groups of earlier generations.
As the newer immigrants contended with adverse conditions in America, those
who would follow them encountered increasing resistance. Restrictionist argu-
ments won increasing support during this period, in spite of their weaknesses.
State regulation of immigration, never very effective, was declared unconstitu-
tional in 1876,88 forcing those who favored a change in immigration policy to turn
to Washington. 9 The decades that followed saw a movement of the Federal Gov-
ernment into immigration regulation roughly contemporary with its movement
into the regulation of railroads, corporations, drugs, and alcohol. Immigration
restriction is at least partly a product of the Progressive commitment to social
engineering.
The first major restrictionist victory was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,9o
which in effect limited immigration from China to a few students and merchants
annually. Fueled by longstanding racism, the restrictionist movement in Cali-
fornia was brought to a head by severe unemployment in the late 1870's and by
the belief of ambitious but frustrated whites that huge corporations using
imported Chinese labor were shutting them out of agriculture, mining, and manu-
facturing. Anti-Chinese prejudice was nationwide: the California Congressmen
had political leverage in Washington and the Chinese had none. Consequently,
Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act (and regularly renewed it91 until its
repeal during World War II).92 In 1907 a "gentleman's agreement" 9 3 sharply lim-
iting Japanese immigration followed in the tradition of Chinese exclusion. 94
Limitation of white European immigration was more difficult. At the urging
of organized labor, contract labor was outlawed in 1885. 9 5 Increasingly strict fed-
eral laws were also passed against the admission of idiots, lunatics, paupers, prosti-
86. R. MURRAY, supra note 75, at 31-32 (1955).
87. G. ABBOTTF, THE IMMIGRANT AND THE COMMUNITY 111 (1917).
88. Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
89. R. DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1924-52, at 2 (1957).
90. Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882)(repealed 1943).
91. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25; Hawaii Annexation Act of 1898, ch. 55, 30 Stat. 750
(extending prior acts' coverage to would-be Hawaiian emigrants); Act of April 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat.
176; Act of April 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 428 (renewing Chinese exclusion once again, but this time
without prospective limitation of the restrictions).
92. Act of December 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
93. See E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 2, at 431.
94. One historian has recently argued that racist stereotypes have been underestimated and economic
motivations exaggerated in standard accounts of the effort to restrict Oriental immigration. S. MILLER,
supra note 38, at 4.
95. Set E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 2, at 88.
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tutes, and criminals,96 but if restrictionists were to attain their more ambitious
goals, regulations affecting whole groups rather than just individuals would be
needed. The most widely favored device between 1890 and 1920 was the literacy
test. Rational and free of ethnic bias on its face, the test would curtail immigra-
tion from southern and eastern, but not western, Europe.97
Congress first sought to enact a literacy test in 1896,98 but the act was vetoed
by President Grover Cleveland with support from Southern Congressmen who
wanted immigrant labor for the industrialization of their states. 99 Recommended
by the Federal Immigration Commission in 1911,'0 the literacy test was again
proposed by Congress in 1913,101 1915,102 and 1917,103 only to be vetoed by Presi-
dents Taft and Wilson.' 0 4 In 1917 Congress enacted the literacy test over Presi-
dent Wilson's veto,' 0 5 thus reflecting the heightened nationalism and fear of aliens
generated by the war.
When the new literacy law did not significantly reduce the number of "unde-
sirable" immigrants, stronger measures were taken. In 1921 Congress imposed a
limit on total immigration and established a quota system limiting annual immi-
gration from each European nation to 3% of the number from that nation residing
in the United States as of 1910.106 This measure reduced the "new" immigration
to 20% of its 1914 total while leaving the "old" immigration at its prewar level.
Southern and eastern European immigration was further reduced in 1924, when
the base census year was changed from 1910 to 1890.107 The proportion of English
immigrants was increased at the expense of all other groups after 1929, when
quotas for individual groups were based on their percentage of the entire Amer-
ican population 0 8 (although no one was quite sure how to determine just what
this was). Asian immigration was prohibited altogether, 0 9 but immigration from
within the Western Hemisphere was unrestricted.
Advocates of the national origins quota legislation were victorious for many
reasons. Postwar strikes, unemployment, and economic depression set the stage, as
did the popularization of the new pseudoscientific racism and the Red Scare. The
earlier supporters of an open immigration policy fell away. Advocates of the
"melting pot" despaired that it was not working. In the postwar recession, eastern
business was more afraid of immigrant radicalism than of labor shortages, while
western representatives could vote for the measures without jeopardizing their
96. Id at 405-36.
97. Id. at 482.
98. Id. at 116-21.
99. Id at 121.
100. U.S. IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, 1 ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMIS-
SION, S. Doc. No. 747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 47 (1911).
101. E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 2, at 154.
102. Id at 163.
103. Id at 167.
104. Id. at 154, 163.
105. Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (amended 1952).
106. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (amended 1924).
107. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
108. See E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 2, at 212.
109. See id. at 434.
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supply of cheap Mexican labor which had been exempted. Using the racist argu-
ments of the restrictionists to justify their antiblack policies, Southerners dropped
their support of open immigration, while ethnic Americans of northern or western
European stock were flattered because the proposed legislation distinguished
between themselves and the undesirables from other areas. Meanwhile, a revived
Ku Klux Klan expressed, among other things, the unease of some Americans with
Jews and other foreigners.
The passage of the national origins quota legislation can be viewed as the tri-
umph of apprehension over hope. Three decades of domestic reform had not
solved the problems of how to live with giant corporations, giant cities, and giant
inequalities in wealth and opportunity at home, nor had the crusade to make the
world safe for democracy shed any light on how to make foreign countries stable,
peaceful, and democratic. The movement to exclude Asian and eastern European
immigrants contained an element of scapegoating mixed with nostalgia and dis-
couragement. Consciously or unconsciously, many Americans blamed the "new"
immigrants for ruining the secure, moral, and egalitarian America of their rural
past, an America that existed mainly in the imagination. Limiting immigration to
the old familiar English and northern European Protestant groups was less a
response to dangers presented by other immigrants than an attempt to escape frus-
trating changes at home and abroad by returning to "normalcy."
IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 1980's
The immigration policy debate of the 1980's has arisen out of much the same
phenomenon that initiated the three historical policy debates described above-a
dramatic rise in immigration by people different from the American mainstream.
Like their predecessors in the antebellum decades and at the turn of the century,
the newest immigrants are coming to a nation experiencing important economic
and political changes. Historical experience suggests that arguments over immi-
gration policy must be examined with an awareness of their relationship to other
national agendas.
The numerical increase in immigration in the past decade and a half has been
striking. From a low of less than 100,000 annually in the 1930's and early 1940's,
immigration climbed to a total of 2,500,000 over the 1960's. In 1978 alone immi-
gration surpassed 600,000, and it has increased every year thereafter.' 10 If undocu-
mented or illegal immigration is included, the current annual total may be
approaching the pre-World War I level of 1,000,000 annually.
Equally striking is the change in the source of the current immigration, most of
which now comes from the Third World rather than Europe. European immigra-
tion decreased from 1,300,000 in the 1960's to 842,000 in the 1970's while, during
the same period, Asian immigration jumped from 362,000 to 1,500,000; African
from 33,000 to 87,000; South American from 219,000 to 266,000; and Mexican
110. Reimers, supra note 1, at 7.
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from 432,000 to 624,000."' In 1977 the three largest sources of immigrationwere
Mexico, the Philippines, and Korea.' 1 2
This new wave of immigrants, with its unprecedented number of Asians and
Hispanics, entered a nation experiencing an energy crisis, a stagnating economy,
an uncontrolled inflation rate, and a stubborn unemployment problem. Equally
important, it entered a nation which had a long history of racial and ethnic dis-
crimination and which had just emerged from a bitter and unsuccessful war in
Southeast Asia. As in the post-World War I period, the United States appears to
be in retreat from a period of intense and overly optimistic preoccupation with
domestic reform; crusades begun in the 1960's against inequality, poverty, and
pollution are no longer national priorities. As in the early 1920's, a period of
intense restrictionist activity, the nation seems to be seeking a return to a not very
clearly defined but socially and politically conservative "normalcy." Since immi-
gration policy in the past has been a reaction to the hopes and fears of the policy-
makers as well as to the objective situation presented by the immigrants, the
impact of these factors on the current policy debate cannot be ignored.
The debates described earlier took place in the absence of comprehensive fed-
eral immigration legislation; federal action to limit immigration was itself the
issue. This is no longer the case. Since Congress placed the numerical limit on
total immigration in 1921, a return to unlimited immigration has never been seri-
ously considered. Instead, debate has focused on the setting of the limit, on the
priorities within that limit, and on the admission of refugees beyond that limit.
The legal context for the current immigration debate is the Immigration Act of
196 5 .1i3 Reflecting the civil rights movement's campaign against racism, the plu-
ralistic views of John F. Kennedy, and Cold War concerns about world opinion,
the Immigration Act of 1965 eliminated the discriminatory national origins quotas
that had controlled immigration since the 1920's. All nations were now treated
equally, with immigration priority given to relatives of persons already in the
United States and to persons with special skills.' 14 Reflecting voters' concerns
about American jobs, Congress placed a limit of 290,000 on total immigration
including, for the first time, immigration from the Western Hemisphere. All per-
sons not entering as relatives or as refugees were required to obtain a labor clear-
ance 'certifying that American workers were not available for their jobs and that
their presence would not reduce prevailing wages or diminish working conditions.
Critics of the Immigration Act of 1965 have complained that its priority system
drains skilled and professional persons from Third World countries which need
their services, and that current discrimination based on past educational opportu-
111. See generall id
112. Id at 11.
113. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 111 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1976)).
114. The Immigration Act of 1965 amended the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 and in scattered sections of 18, 22, 31, and 50
App. U.S.C. (1976)). For a summary of the legislative history of the 1965 Act, see E. HUTCHINSON, supra
note 2, at 366-79. For further analysis of both acts, see C. KEELY, U.S. IMMIGRATION: A POLICY ANAL-
Ysis 15-23 (1978).
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nities is no more just than past discrimination based on race and national origin.
Most of the opposition to current immigration policy, however, focuses on immi-
grants other than the 290,000 admitted annually under the Immigration Act of
1965; it focuses on the refugees and undocumented migrants who constitute the
vast majority of current immigrants. Since World War II large numbers of refu-
gees have entered the country. These have included Hungarian freedom fighters,
Dutch refugees from Indonesia, Chinese Nationalists, Cubans, and in recent years,
Southeast Asians. Because of the unavailability of sufficient visas under general
immigration legislation, refugees have entered under special acts of Congress or,
more recently, under the Attorney General's emergency power to admit
"parolees," subject to later approval by Congress."t 5 Critics have expressed con-
cern that increased use of the Attorney General's parole power circumvents Con-
gressional control of immigration.' 6
Illegal immigrants include students, tourists, and other temporary residents of
many nationalities who "disappear" permanently into American' society. The
majority, however, are Mexican laborers who regularly cross the loosely guarded
border to work on the farms, ranches, and factories of the Southwest. In 1978 the
Congressional Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy estimated that
there were between 3,000,000 and 6,000,000 undocumented migrants in this
country." 7 The exact number is difficult to ascertain. Like the unskilled Euro-
pean laborers at the turn of the century, many Mexican migrants work here for a
brief period and then return home to stay. Others shuttle back and forth
repeatedly.
Despite changes in the times, the nation, and the composition of the latest
wave of immigrants, much of the current policy debate has a familiar ring to per-
sons acquainted with immigration history. The post-World War II consensus for a
generous policy rested on the familiar combination of humanitarian and political
considerations. The United States wished to reunite divided families and to pro-
vide refuge for the oppressed-especially, given Cold War priorities, the oppressed
from Communist-controlled nations. The abandonment of racist national origins
quotas in 1965 reflected both conscience and the Cold War priority of courting the
good opinion of uncommitted and Third World countries.
As new Asian and Hispanic ethnic communities became conspicuous in Amer-
ican cities, turn-of-the-century views on the benefits of cultural pluralism were
heard again. These views were reinforced and updated by the "new ethnicity" of
the early 1970's. City dwellers enjoyed the new ethnic shops and restaurants, and
officials were delighted when newly arrived ethnic groups restored deteriorated
neighborhoods." ,8
With the energy crisis and recession of the mid-1970's, the national mood
became less hospitable, while the immigrants became more numerous. The gov-
115. See E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 2, at 561-63.
116. C. KEELY, supra note 114, at 69-70.
117. Seeid. at 51; Reimers, supra note 1, at 6-7.
118. See Fitzpatrick & Parker, Hipantc Americans ih the Eastern United States, in AMERICA AS A MUL-
TICULTURAL SOCIETY 110 (454 Annals, M. Gordon ed. 1981).
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ernment recognized a special obligation to Vietnamese refugees, admitting 150,000
in 1975 alone. Their admission was controversial, however; the country was in a
major recession, and both advocates and opponents of the recent war found its
refugees suspect. A number of Governors and Congressmen made it clear that
they did not want many refugees in their own states, and public opinion polls in
1975 and 1976 showed most Americans to be against admission of the
Vietnamese. 1 9 Objections were also raised to the arrival of flotillas of undocu-
mented Cubans and Haitians in 1980 and 1981,120 and to the continuing influx of
illegal migrants from Mexico. 12 1 These objections were political as well as eco-
nomic. A nation still smarting from its long and humiliating inability to extricate
its citizens taken hostage in Iran was sensitive to charges of weakness in its dealings
with foreign states. In its early months, the Reagan administration seemed deter-
mined to assert a position of mastery in dealing with foreign nations-and with
illegal immigrants from foreign nations.
"We have lost control of our borders," said Attorney General Smith in 1981,
proposing to reassert control through increased border patrols, new detention facil-
ities along the borders, and fines for employers of undocumented workers. 22 The
continuing need for inexpensive labor in the Southwest was to be met by the insti-
tution of a "guest" or temporary worker program for Mexican labor.'2 3 The
Reagan administration proposed an amnesty for Mexicans who had entered the
country illegally before January 1, 1980, accompanied by a ten-year waiting
period during which these aliens would pay taxes but remain ineligible for welfare,
food stamps, and unemployment benefits. 124  These new proposals reflect
America's continued ambivalence over immigration; immigrants are wanted for
their cheap labor but feared as a potential economic burden.
Given the uncertain state of the American economy, it is not surprising that
economic issues are prominent in the current debate. As in the past, it is widely
argued that immigrant labor takes jobs needed by unemployed Americans. For-
eign workers, the argument goes, accept inferior wages, benefits, and working con-
ditions, thus driving out American labor by unfair competition. In some quarters,
the economic debate over immigration has become more heated. American blacks
rioted to protest what they saw as the unfair economic advantages enjoyed by
Cubans in Florida. Vietnamese shrimp fishermen were physically attacked by
native-born competitors in the Gulf of Mexico. Blacks, Hispanics, and
Indochinese competed for jobs and housing in Los Angeles County.
Since the American economy is no longer expanding as it was at the time of
119. See Refugees: A Cool and Wagy Reception, TIME, May 12, 1975, at 24, 26; Schaefer & Schaefer,
Reluctant Welcome: US Response to Vetnamese Refugees, 4 NEW COMMUNITY 366-70 (1976).
120. See S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, "TEMPORARY" ALIEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 6
(1982).
121. See id. at 66-68.
122. Buffalo Courier Express, Aug. 2, 1981, at C2, col. 1-2.
123. Similar "bracero" programs were instituted during the 194 0 's and carried through the early
1950's, but abruptly ended with the mass deportation of undocumented workers in 1954. For a recent
account, seeJ. GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS IN 1954 (1980); see also M. HERRERA-SOBEK, THE BRACERO EXPERIENCE (1979).
124. See S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note 120, at 82-83.
[Vol. 45: No. 2
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
earlier immigration debates, the economic argument for restriction appears more
cogent than before. The lesson of the earlier debates, however, suggests caution.
Current unemployment, like the unemployment of the past, is due to a variety of
regional, social, and technological factors going beyond a simple oversupply of
labor. The migration of industry from the Northeast and Great Lakes regions to
the "sunbelt" began before the latest wave of immigration and will doubtless con-
tinue, leaving unemployment in its wake regardless of immigration policy. The
plight of the "hard-core," native-born unemployed can be attributed to many fac-
tors independent of immigration. As in the past, today's immigrants often take
jobs that are not wanted by Americans-migratory agricultural labor, for
example, or menial service positions. The deportation of undocumented Mexicans
or Haitians may be desired for other reasons, but its positive effect on the employ-
ment prospects of automobile workers in Detroit or Buffalo is dubious. It is
equally questionable whether the barring of immigrant physicians would result in
more native-born minority physicians--especially with the costs of higher educa-
tion rising, federal loan programs for students being cut, and affirmative action no
longer a priority.
The economic argument introduced by the New England Puritans that immi-
grants use resources needed by others has been revived in a nation coming to the
painful realization that its resources are not inexhaustible. With inflation
shrinking real wages, hard-pressed taxpayers worry that immigrants may swell the
welfare rolls. Local governments resist the expense of providing schools and other
services for immigrants who cluster in their communities.125 Local officials worry
about budget cuts and warnings about the need to replace federal aid with local
responsibility. Like the eugenicists of the past, ecology-minded advocates of zero
population growth (ZPG) deplore the birth rate among immigrants. Their con-
cern is not that immigrants will pollute the national bloodline, but that they will
make America too crowded. They also oppose immigration on the grounds that it
will increase the population of a nation that already uses more than its share of the
world's resources. "On the average, each of us consumes four times as much grain
and 37 times as much energy as a Filipino. . . . There's no need for more
Americans. "126
Fear that undocumented immigrants drain resources by going on welfare is
unrealistic; illegal aliens often avoid applying for charity or welfare for fear of
being deported. Fear that federal aid for areas of heavy immigrant settlement will
fall victim to the administration's effort to balance the budget are more realistic.
However, experience with government assistance to both Hungarian refugees and
the earlier arrivals from Cuba, who have moved rapidly into the American main-
stream, suggests that federal budget-cutting in this area would be shortsighted.
Most immigrants come to the United States with the hope of improving their
living standard, so it is likely that once here they will indeed increase their con-
125. Crewdson,Access to Free Educationfor Illegal/Alien Children, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1980, at BI0, col.
3.
126. ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, 2 ZPG LOOKS AT IMMIGRATION 9-10 (1978), quoted in KEELY,
supra note 114, at 49.
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sumption of the world's resources. Advocates of ZPG may be partially reassured,
however, by the historical experience that immigrant birthrates usually fall as eco-
nomic and educational levels rise.
The shortage of resources worldwide may be real, but it is a less immediate
problem for most Americans than is the shortage of resources at home. The pros-
pect of immigrant groups competing with one another and with the native-born
poor for diminishing urban resources that are likely to be further diminished
because of economic recession and federal budget-cutting is uncomfortably remi-
niscent of competition for jobs at the turn of the century. At that time, employers
pitted ethnic communities against one another to prevent the united action that
might have improved conditions for all of them. Care must be taken that current
economic frustrations are not vented in simplistic campaigns against immigra-
tion-as was the case in the late 19th century crusade against the Chinese in
California.
Care must also be taken to avoid another error made repeatedly by restriction-
ists in the past: underestimation of the economic role of the immigrants as produ-
cers of wealth rather than merely as consumers of resources. Cuban immigrants
have revitalized the economy of southern Florida, Koreans have built their own
shopping area in Los Angeles, and immigrants furnish much of the workforce for
the garment industry in New York, as well as for many industries in the South-
west. 127 European labor at the turn of the century contributed more to the Amer-
ican economy than it extracted from it, although this was not clearly understood at
the time. Similarly, today's undocumented migrants contribute more in labor and
taxes than they take away in salaries and benefits, so that the economy gains
rather than loses from their participation. 128 Just as economic advances of the past
often stemmed from the presence of immigrants to free American labor for more
lucrative tasks, the availability of immigrants to do labor-intensive work today
may foster new industrial growth. The issue then may become not how to keep
immigrant labor out, but how to guarantee it a fair share of the wealth that it
helps to produce.
Arguments that immigrants are dangerous to the nation's political stability-a
staple of earlier immigration debates-are rarely heard today. Still, given today's
political climate, there may be unspoken fears that larger minority populations
will increase minority political activism, raising the possibility of disorders reminis-
cent of the 1960's.129 Immigration policy is entangled, moreover, in political bat-
tles between liberals and conservatives over America's posture toward
controversial foreign regimes, especially rightwing dictatorships. In the Cold War
context of the 1950's, refugees were defined as persons fleeing Communist regimes
or the Middle East. 130 This policy was continued by the Reagan administration,
which identifies left- but not rightwing dictatorships as a threat to peace. Liberals
127. S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note 120, at 111.
128. Id at 39.
129. See C. KEELY, supra note 114, at 52-53; Pachon & Moore, Mexican Amenicans, in AMERICA AS A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 122 (454 Annals, M. Gordon ed. 1981).
130. WEINTRAUB & Ross, supra note 120, at 5.
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urge condemnation of rightwing governments for their human rights practices and
argue that persons fleeing such governments, or even persons fleeing extreme pov-
erty, should be granted refugee status. The Reagan administration's rejection of
this claim is demonstrated by its denial of refugee status to Haitians.
The fate of the Haitians raises racial as well as political issues; black leaders in
the United States have suggested that the treatment of the Haitians might have
been different had these refugees been white. Overtly racist statements against
immigration, so common at the turn of the century, are rarely heard in the current
debate. Racial discriminaton was embodied in the nation's immigration laws until
1965, however; and the recent economically troubled times have been marked by
an increase in the activities of overtly racist fringe groups such as the American
Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan. 1 3 '
Roughly coincident with these developments, a new cadre of academicians
have published controversial findings stressing the controlling role of heredity in
human evolution. Most notably, educational psychologist Arthur Jensen has
claimed that I.Q. tests prove black children to be innately less intelligent than
white children.132 Given these developments, and the fact that the current wave of
predominantly Asian and Hispanic immigration is noticeably altering the ratio
between mainstream whites and minorities, racism cannot be ruled out as a hidden
motive in the current restrictionist movement.
Some commentators are suggesting that, because of their non-European back-
ground, current immigrants will be more difficult to assimilate than their earlier
counterparts. 33 Similar concerns were expressed about the assimilability of virtu-
ally every non-English group, from the colonial Germans to the 20th-century
Italians, Poles, and Jews. In each case these fears proved unfounded.
Like other immigrants, those from the Third World have assimilated and will
continue to assimilate at varying rates, depending on their social class, education,
and skills before immigration, and on the economic opportunities and outside help
available to them and the level of prejudice they encounter after arrival. A large
proportion of recent immigrants from Asia had been educated, often in the profes-
sions, before their arrival, and therefore have moved easily into the American
middle class. The Korean community, 90% of whom have resided here for fewer
than fifteen years, have largely adjusted to life in their adopted country. It has
been suggested that "as a whole the [Vietnamese] refugees may be better prepared
to cope with life in America than the Jewish, Japanese, Korean, and [F]ilipino
131. See generally Turner, Stanton, Vahala & Williams, The Klan Today, in SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
CENTER, THE Ku KLux KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM AND VIOLENCE 48 (1982).
132. Jensen,How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastzc Achievement?, 39 HARVARD EDUC. REV. I (1969).
Jensen found almost the same I.Q. gap between blacks and whites that educational psychologists found in
the 1920's between children of southern and eastern European immigrants and mainstream American
children. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
Jensen's findings, like those cited by eugenicists in the 1920's, have generated considerable controversy.
See, e.g., R. HERRNSTEIN, I.Q. IN THE MERITOCRACY (1973); P. SANDAY, ON THE CAUSES OF IQ DIFFER-
ENCES BETWEEN GROUPS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY (1972).
133. See, e.g., Buffalo Courier Express, Sept. 13, 1981, at C5, col. 8.
Page 137: Spring 1982]
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
laborers of yesteryear."1 34
Concerns about the nation's rapidly growing Hispanic community often focus
on problems of language rather than those of race or ethnicity. Protests against
continued immigration of Cubans, Mexicans, and other Hispanics often reflect
fear that Spanish will become a second language in the United States. 35 Like
protests against the widespread use of German in colonial Pennsylvania, these
objections reflect both an English language chauvinism and a fear that the foreign
language speakers will destroy the cultural integrity of an English-speaking nation.
If the children or grandchildren of German-speaking immigrants in rural Penn-
sylvania learned English, however, it is scarcely conceivable that the descendants
of Hispanic immigrants, aided by the electronic media if not by the public schools,
will not do the same. Nor does immigration history lend support to the fear that
immigrants who continue to speak their native language are more likely to be
troublesome or dangerous to the rest of the nation.
Undoubtedly, this country must regulate immigration. With much of the
world suffering from hunger or political oppression, the United States would prob-
ably be overwhelmed by immigrants if no numerical ceiling were set. Valid
(though ever-changing) domestic and foreign policy reasons for admitting one
individual or group as opposed to another do exist. The current situation-in
which most immigrants enter the country outside the primary legislative appa-
ratus, either as refugees or as illegals-suggests that systematic administrative and
legislative adjustments are needed. Immigration history alone cannot suggest pre-
cisely what those adjustments should be, but it can warn against making policy
based on racial and ethnic prejudice-covert as well as overt. Equally important,
it can warn against using immigration restriction to "solve" social and economic
problems whose solutions lie elsewhere.
134. Kitano, Asian Amerncans, in AMERICA AS A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 137 (454 Annals, M.
Gordon ed. 1981).
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